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JOINT CUSTODY
By CAROLYN S. BRATr*
And the.king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought
a sword before the king.
And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and
give half to the one, and half to the .other.
Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto
the king, . and she said, 0 my lord, give her the living
child, and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be
neither mine no thine, but divide it.
Then the king answered and said, Give her the living
child, and in no wise slay it: she is the mother thereof,
And all Israel heard of the judgment which the king had
judged; and they feared the king: for they saw the wisdom of
God was in him, to do judgment.1
Custody battles have been with us for a long time; Solo-
mon's wisdom in resolving the custody dispute before him is
renowned. In today's society we place judges in our courts in
Solomon-like positions, but without the comfort of such readily
apparent solutions. If one parent of the two requesting custody
is truly unfit, the question is similar to the one Solomon re-
solved and the decision is not difficult. But rarely do judges
find themselves in such a position. More often, judges confront
two custodians who appear to be fit. These cases, in which
neither party is clearly "unfit," present the decision-maker
with a perplexing problem that does not lend itself easily to
solution by the application of law or legal precedent.
The legal standard given the judge to apply in child cus-
tody cases-"in the best interests of the child"-begs the ques-
tion. The best interests of a child are determined by a complex
combination of psychological, economic, and social factors.
The interrelationship and relative importance of these factors
are in much dispute. These factors have led to an ever-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. State University of
New York at Albany, 1965; J.D. Syracuse University, 1974.
The valuable research of Susan Cammarata, second year law student, University
of Kentucky, and the editorial suggestions of Carolyn A. Dye, J.D. 1976, University of
Kentucky, in the preparation of this article deserve special recognition.
1 1 Kings 3:24-28.
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changing collection of legal and psychological theories.2 An
additional complication is that the best interests must be de-
termined in light of the-facts and circumstances of the individ-
ual child and family before the court. Thus, the judge's experi-
ence in one case is of little value in deciding another.
Judges resolving these disputes are faced with an enor-
mous task. Their decisions are made more difficult by limita-
tions imposed by the forum-an adversary hearing-and the
time constraints within which they must work.
The lives and personalities of at least two adults and one
child are telescoped and presented to him in a few hours.
From this capsule presentation he must decide where lie the
best interests of the child or, very often, which parent will
harm the child least. The judge's verdict is distilled from the
hardest kind of fact finding. From sharply disputed evidence,
he must predict the future conduct of parents on his appraisal
of their past conduct. And his decision is disturbingly final.
Since it is based fundamentally on factual findings, an appel-
late court will rarely disturb it.
3
Furthermore, most judges have had little or no training in psy-
chiatry, social work, or other nonlegal disciplines which might
assist them in making the decision.
4
The contested custody case is a many-headed hydra; any
decision will have an impact on the lives of the children and
parents involved that will continue for years. This Article does
not purport to provide a solution which will satisfactorily re-
solve each and every custody dispute. Instead, this Article pro-
poses a method which will prevent a certain class of custody
cases from becoming part of the court's docket of seemingly
insoluable contested custody cases. The method, simply
stated, is judicial approval of shared custody arrange-
ments-those in which two parents agree to share custody of
the child or children of their marriage. Of course, this proposal
would not relieve the court's burden of assessing the adequacy
of the care the children will receive. But absent a factual find-
2 See note 65 infra for five "factors" to be considered by the judge. See text at
notes 106-48 for a general discussion of the psychological theories applicable in custody
cases.
3 B. BOrmN, TRai JuDGE 273 (1952).
Bratt, Beyond the Law School Classroom and Clinic-A Multi-disciplinary Ap-
proach to Legal Education, 13 Naw ENGLarw L. Rzv. 199 (1978).
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ing that such an arrangement is more detrimental to the child
than sole custody, no court should impose sole custody when
the parents have agreed to shared custody.
Shared custody has traditionally been looked upon with
disfavor by the courts.5 Similarly, some professionals in the
field of child development oppose the concept of shared cus-
tody.' There are, however, several advantages to shared cus-
tody. The legal system benefits, as judges escape the unenvia-
ble task of playing Solomon. The child benefits because both
parents continue to have a voice in the child's upbringing, and
the child continues to enjoy the love, advice, and companion-
ship of both parents. In addition, because both parents share
the responsibility of child raising, neither is faced with the loss
of self-esteem which results from being designated a "visitor"
to his or her child. Finally, all parties involved benefit signifi-
cantly by avoiding a bruising custody battle with its attendant
bitterness and emotional damage.
I. PRESENT CUSTODY AwARDs: THE PROBLEM
A. The Statistics
At the turn of this century approximately one in ten
marriages ended in divorce;7 the current ratio is one in three.8
This increase has been attributed to causes as diverse as the
resurgence of the feminist movement, the increased mobility
of Americans, and the widespread adoption of "no-fault"
divorce laws. Whatever the cause or causes, this increase
has caused a seven-fold increase in the number of children
affected by divorce since the turn of the century.' Currently,
over one million children a year experience their parents'
divorce."0 Thus, an increasing number of child custody
See cases cited in note 60 infra.
'J. GOLDSTEN, A. FREUD & A. SoLINT, BEYOND TE BEsT INTEREST OF THE CHILD
37-38 (1973). Goldstein, Freud, and Solint have gone so far as to recommend that all
custody determinations be made fmal with custody awarded to one parent. The non-
custodial parent would have no legal right to visit the child and the custodial parent
would decide whether visits by the noncustodial parent were desirable.
7 Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 L. AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 700, 711
(1944).
'M. ROMm & W. HADDAD, THE DIspOsABL PARENT 48 (1978).
* 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND ma AluCAN FUTURE, DEmo-
GRAPHIC AND SOCIAL AsPECTS OF POPULATION GRoWTH 255 (1972).
11 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YoiTH, AMERicA's
CtLDREN 1976 at 61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AMERCA'S CHILDREN].
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determinations must be made by the courts.
At present, an estimated ninety percent of all custody
awards are made in favor of the mother." Over ten million
children under eighteen-one out of every six children under
the age of eighteen-live in single parent families,'2 most of
which are headed by women.1 3 More than half of the children
living in families headed by women are below the official pov-
erty level; only fifteen percent of all families are below that
level." Thus, granting sole custody to a mother significantly
increases the chances that the child will become another grim
statistic by experiencing significant economic deprivation.
Courts usually grant sole custody to the mother on the
theory that she will provide full-time nurturing. However,
available data indicates that a child of divorce placed in the
custody of the mother will not have the mother's full-time at-
tention and companionship at home. In families headed by
women in 1975, forty-seven percent of the mothers with pre-
school age children were in the labor force and fifty-seven per-
cent of the mothers with school-aged children were in the labor
force. 5 Clearly, traditional sole custody awards placing full
" Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, J. FAm. L. 423
(1976-77).
12 AmEmC's CHLDmE, supra note 10, at 59.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 62.
Percent of Children in Official Poverty
1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974
In all
families 26.5 22.7 17.4 15.3 14.9 14.9 15.5
In families
headed by
women 68.4 62.3 58.2 55.2 53.0 53.1 51.5
These statistics reflect the fact that women working full time outside the home
earn, on the average, 60 percent of the wages of men working full time outside the
home. Id. at 65. Also, many women are single heads of household comprised of pre-
school age children, id. at 64, and are not able to work at all because of the demands
of child care and lack of day care facilities.
1I Id. at 64.
The comparison of the percentage of women who work full time outside the home
in two-parent families to the percentage of women who work full time outside the home
in female-headed families is startling. The following chart indicates the percent of
women who work full time outside the home:
[Vol. 67
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responsibility for child care on the mother guarantee the child
neither a full-time custodial parent nor reasonable economic
security. In addition, divorced mothers who have been awarded
custody receive little financial assistance from their children's
father after the divorce. Fathers regularly ignore their court-
ordered responsibility for child support payments." Appar-
ently, the fathers feel they have not only divorced their wives,
but also .their children.
Thus, the sole custody award often isolates children from
their fathers and forces mothers into the work force. The
mother, as sole caretaker as well as breadwinner, is confronted
with an overwhelming responsibility.
Married, Husband Present 1974
One or more One or One Two
No Children under 6, none more under under
Children 6-17 yrs. under 3 under 3 5 yrs. 5 yrs.
71% 54% 40% 31% 36% 26%
Divorced, Separated, Widowed
78% 71% 62% 46% 59% 38%
Id.
' Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HAsIINGs L.J. 171, 190 (1971).
The Probability of a Divorced Woman
Collecting Any Child Support Money
(by years since the court order)
Non-paying
fathers
against whom
Years since Number of Full Partial No legal action
court order open cases Compliance Compliance Compliance taken
One 163 38% 20% 42% 19%
Two 163 28 20 52 32
Three 161 26 14 60 21
Four 161 22 11 67 18
Five 160 19 14 67 9
Six 158 17 12 71 6
Seven 157 17 12 71 4
Eight 155 17 8 75 2
Nine 155 17 8 75 0
Ten 149 13 8 79 1
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B. Changing Parental Roles
Petitioners asking for joint custody must often overcome
the judge's notion that fathers have little or no parenting skill.
Custody awards are being made by courts still laboring under
the romanticized notion of a family in which the mother is the
sole full time nurturer while the father, employed outside the
home, is the sole breadwinner.
When the wage labor of men and the private labor of women
were split, parental roles were made mutually exclusive. The
result has been to confuse two entirely separate phenomena.
Because women did, and probably still do, most of the work
of raising children, it was assumed that they and they alone
were the natural (hence superior) caretakers of the young.
Making ...the acts of motherhood interchangeable with
facts, our culture came to equate motherhood with parent-
hood."
Just as mothers are assumed to lack job skills, fathers are as-
sumed to lack child-rearing skills.
There are very few studies in social research on "father-
ing." In fact, studies on parents in America, patterns of child-
rearing, and divorced parents have consistently relied on the
mother to supply information on the father's thoughts and
feelings.'" The validity of the conclusions of such studies,
stressing the primacy of the mother-child relationship to the
almost total exclusion of the father's role in parenting, is ob-
viously suspect.19 Without attempting to explain the nature of
the relationships between mother and child and father and
child in psychological or sociological terms, a number of objec-
'7 RoMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 85.
IS See J. Grief, Child Absence: Fathers' Perceptions of Their Relationship to Their
Children Subsequent to Divorce, 3-4 (1977) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Adel-
phi University); H. Keshet, Part-time Fathers: A Study of Separated and Divorced
Men, 14-15 (1977) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan). For an
example of such a study, see T. PARSONS & R. BALES, FAMmv SoCLIAxUTON AND INTER-
ACTION PROCESS (1955).
" Recently there has been an upsurge in interest in the father-child relationship.
See L. BENSON, FATHERHOOD: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); H. BaLER & D.
MEREDITH, FATHER POWER (1974); D. LYNN, THE FATHER: His ROLE IN CmD
DEvELoPMENT (1974); E.E. LEMASTERS, PARENTS IN MODERN AMERICA (1970); H. Bmiy,
THE FATHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIP: SoME CLINICAL IssuEs IN THE FAMILy-CAN IT BE
SAVED? (Vaughan & Brazelton, eds. 1976).
[Vol. 67
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tive factors can be examined which debunk the myth of
mother-nurturer/father-breadwinner.
1. The Changing Role of Women
The Department of Labor reported in 1978 that more than
fifty percent of all women over eighteen were in the labor
force,"0 the largest percentage of female participation in the
labor market this country has ever experienced .2 From 1970 to
1975 the number of working mothers rose by seventeen percent,
from twelve to fourteen million.2 These working women in 1975
were the mothers of 27.6 million children.? In 1975 forty-five
percent of all married women were in the labor force. 2 The
increase in the number of working women should not be dis-
missed as an insignificant phenomenon; in 1975 working
women in wife-husband families accounted for twenty-six per-
cent of family income.?
The stereotype family of full-time housewife and sole
breadwinner husband no longer reflects the family arrange-
ment of many American marriages.2' Because of this change,
our traditional ideas of the division of parenting and household
responsibilities may be obsolete, too. When women with chil-
dren work, certain changes occur within the home in the assign-
ment of household tasks such as child care, in the allocation of
decision-making, and in attitudes about appropriate sex-role
behavior.
Working wives and their husbands have significantly dif-
" U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, 25 EMPLOYmENT AND EAR~INos 43, (Dec. 1978).
"Id.
" AMERICA'S CinmRm, supra note 10, at 53.
Traditionally, labor participation rates are less for women in their childbearing
years (ages twenty-five to thirty-four) than for other women. In 1950 the rate was
twenty-five percent less; in 1974 it was only twenty percent less.
1 Id. at 54.
2 Id. at 55.
2 Id. at 57.
' The Social Security Act of 1939 was predicated on the notion that all women
were wives who stayed at home as dependents of their breadwinner husband. In Wein-
berger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Supreme Court found that this stereo-
type of the "typical" family was insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of a provi-
sion of the Social Security Act granting benefits only to mothers. There have been
numerous demands for reform of the Social Security-Act because of its inaccurate
presumption of role allocation within the family. E.g., Martin, Social Security Benefits
for Spouses, 63 CoNRam L. Rzv. 789 (1978).
1978-79]
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ferent attitudes toward decision making, reflecting more equal
authority expectations," than nonworking wives and their hus-
bands. While there is little reported difference in the actual
power of working wives versus nonworking wives with respect
to their husbands, 8 working wives make more family decisions
than nonworking wives.29
Working wives tend to be less likely to endorse traditional
sex role ideology than nonworking wives."0 This change in atti-
tude toward the traditional sex-based dichotomy of family
roles is also evidenced in the altered parenting function of fa-
thers in families with two working parents. Available evidence
confirms that husbands of working wives are generally more
active than husbands of nonworking wives in performing
household tasks. Even though working wives still perform the
majority of the household chores, their husbands are much
more involved with the chores and childcare than other hus-
bands. 1 Another study found that children, too, usually partic-
ipate more in household activities if their mother works than
when their mother does not work outside the home.32 Thus, the
division of labor within the home between husband and wife
appears to be strongly affected by the wife's outside employ-
ment.33
Therefore the traditional wife-housewife/husband-
breadwinner model is not applicable when the wife is employed
' Blood & Hamblin, The Effect of Wife's Employment on the Family Power
Structure, 36 Soc. FORCES 347, 347-52 (1958).
0 Hoffman, Effects of the Employment of Mothers on Parental Role Relations and
Division of Household Tasks, 22 MARR. & FAM. LrVNG 22, 27-35 (1960).
Power was defined as the extent to which one parent makes decisions affecting the
other parent. This was determined by children's responses to questions about which
parent decided certain issues and which parent acted in certain situations.
" See Heer, Dominance and the Working Wife, 36 Soc. FORCES 341, 341-47 (1958);
D. Kligler, The Effects of Employment of Married Women'on Husband and Wife
Roles: A Study of Cultural Change (1954) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale
University).
"Hoffman, supra note 28.
' Kligler, supra note 29; Nolan & Tuttle, Certain Practices, Satisfactions and
Difficulties in Families with Employed Homemakers, Bulletin No. 655, Agricultural
Experiment Station, Pa. State Univ. (1959); Weil, An Analysis of the Factors Influenc-
ing Married Women's Actual or Planned Work Participation, AM. Soc. Rhv. 26, 91-96
(1961).
" S. Greenwald, Family Responsibilities of Selected Working Mothers (1959)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University).
'F. NYE & L. HoFmwN, Tim EMPLOYED Mo'rnn rN AMERIcA 215-305.(1963).
[Vol. 67
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outside the home. As mothers continue to enter the labor force,
judges can no longer realistically base custody decisions on
such an increasingly inaccurate stereotype of the divorcing
family.
2. The Changing Role of Men
Other kinds of evidence indicate that fathers are becoming
more involved with childraising. For example, increasing
amounts of literature are encouraging greater involvement by
men in parenting." Some men have attempted to redefue
"masculinity" by emphasizing expressive interpersonal skill
development and active parenting." Fathers are urged to learn
and foster nurturing skills traditionally associated only with-
mothering.
The number of father headed homes has increased stead-
ily, from 296,000 in 1960 to 836,000 in 1974.6 More fathers are
seeking and winning custody of children than in the past; be-
tween 1970 and 1974 the number of children under six living
with a divorced father increased faster than the percentage of
such children living with a divorced mother-thirty-seven per-
cent versus thirty-one percent."
Other observable phenomena indicate increased involve-
ment of fathers in traditional childrearing activities. New or-
ganizations of and for men have appeared,3' attempting to
change antiquated divorce laws and lending support to men
who want or have more than the traditional amount of child-
care responsibilities. Similarly, the renewed feminist move-
ment in this country has been advocating equal participation
of both parents in childrearing for over a decade.3'
The courts, always notoriously hesitant to reflect changes
See, H. BiaaR, PATnNAL DEPRIvATioN (1974); Bxmuz & MmmRDrmT, supra note
19; F. DODSON, How TO FATHER (1974); M. FEIGEN FASTEAU, Tan MAtE MACanz (1974);
and LYNN, supra note 19.
3 Greif, supra note 18, at 3.
3 Keshet, supra note 18, at 5.
37 Id.
s E.g., Single-Fathers Research Project, Greenville, North Carolina; Fathers
United for Equal Rights, Orange, New Jersey; The Society of Single Fathers, Toronto,
Canada; and National Society of Fathers for Child Custody Divorce Law Reform,
Miami, Florida.
3' See, e.g., Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93
D~n~us 607 (1964).
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in the social fabric of -this country, have ignored changes in
family roles in divorce decisions, even though the mother-
nurturer/father-breadwinner image may not have accurately
reflected division of parenting responsibilities for a significant
period of time. Indeed, in 1952 a study drawn from fathers'
responses on the activities and attitudes of men in regard to
their paternal role showed as one of its conclusions that the
father role is an active family role. The fathers who were polled
actually participated in routine daily care of the child and a
majority considered childrearing a part of the requirements of
the father role. The author concluded that the study indicated
"a changing pattern of paternity in the direction of a more
equalitarian relationship rather than atrophy or abdication of
the father's role in the family.""
This changing pattern has continued. Any child custody
decision predicated on automatic application of traditional sex
role stereotyping of parents' roles injures the child by casting
the parents' functioning into molds that in most cases do not
reflect the family's lifestyle.
II. THE LAW'S ANSWER
A. Background
Certainly no overpowering societal or historical force pre-
vents courts from breaking out of the confines of sex role stereo-
types. The law regulating child custody has not been static in
the past, just as it should not be unchanging now. Changes in
societal attitudes toward children's rights and changing eco-
nomic conditions have resulted in changes in the legal ap-
proach to child custody.
For example, early English laws on child custody reflected
the concepts of feudal patriarchy."1 The children of vassals were
property of the lord. Within the family, the powers of parents
vis-a-vis their children were absolutely vested in the father.
As feudalism eroded, society's perception of children began
to change. The child slowly began to emerge as a person with
certain rights and privileges as well as duties. Increased indus-
0 Tasch, The Role of the Father in the Family, 20 J. ExPzmMRrA.L EDuc. 319,
358 (1952).
11 RoMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 27-33; Roth, supra note 11, at 425-28.
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trialization de-emphasized the family's role as the economic
center of life by causing fathers to work outside the home. As
the father's time away from.the home increased, his absolute
right to control of his children decreased.
In the nineteenth century the courts began at least to dis-
cuss, if not act on, the conflict between the father's absolute
right to his children and the children's interests. Some mothers
were awarded custody in cases of gross misconduct by the fa-
ther or in cases of extremely young children, or both.42 In the
early twentieth century the nuclear family emerged, with its
strict distinction between father's work outside the home and
mother's work within the home. The courts suddenly divined
that the mother role gave wives the superior position in custody
disputes.43 The tender years presumption, based on the idea
that very young children should be with their mother, emerged.
Because this strict functional dichotomy between mother
and father no longer exists, courts should now take the next
step in this historical progression by allowing both parents to
continue to function actively in their child's life. The court
should both encourage and facilitate a new definition of parent-
ing.
B. A Statutory Analysis44
Despite innovative thought and law review articles advo-
cating change, judges are not wont to move without being sure
of their power and authority to do so. Does the court have the
42 RoMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 30-33.
0 It is interesting to compare the courts' language from the days when a father's
rights to custody were considered paramount to the language used when a mother's
rights to custody emerged as superior-in either case God ordained it!
It [the authority of the father] is the doctrine of all civilized nations. It is
according to the revealed law and the law of nature, and it prevails even with
the wondering savage, who has received none of the lights of civilization.
Foster v. Alston, 4 Miss. (6 Howard) 406, 463 (1842) (Sharkey, J. dissenting).
There is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of
heaven, and all things being equal, no child should be deprived of that
maternal influence unless it be shown there are special or extraordinary
reasons for so doing.
Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938).
" Research on the permissibility of a joint custody award in Kentucky was a result
of work of this author and David A. Bratt, J.D. 1978, University of Kentucky, in
preparation of a joint petition for joint custody of their son, Douglass. The custody
arrangement was approved in Bratt v. Bratt, Fayette Circuit Court #77-2880 (Ky. Aug.
19, 1978).
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power and authority to approve a petition from both parents
for shared custody of their child?
Sharing of custody, both legal and physical, is not a new
practice. Joint, divided, alternate, and split custody are terms
used to describe various custodial arrangements which provide
for a sharing of legal and physical custody between parents.
These types of custody arrangements have been permitted
from time to time in many jurisdictions." Joint custody usually
denominates that type of custody arrangement which gives
both parents "legal responsibility for the child's care and alter-
nating companionship."48 Legal custody of the child is shared
E.g., Sneed v. Sneed, 26 So.2d 561 (Ala. 1946) (mother, nine months, father,
three months); Henning v. Henning, 362 P.2d 124 (Ariz. 1961) (mother nine months,
father, three months); Hewitt v. Morgan, 246 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. 1952) (mother, six
months, father, six months); Winn v. Winn, 299 P.2d 721 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)
(legal custody to both parents, physical custody to mother); Searle v. Searle, 172 P.2d
837 (Colo. 1946) (mother, nine months, father, three months); Snow v. Snow, 280 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (mother, school year, father, school vacation); Dworkis v.
Dworkis, 111 So.2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (mother, school year, father, summer);
Bagley v. Bagley, 177 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1970) (father, nine months, mother, three
months); Hellrung v. Hellrung, 72 N.E.2d 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) (father, nine months,
mother, three months); Stillmunkes v. Stillmunkes, 65 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1954).
(mother, eleven months, father, one month); Lewis v. Lewis, 537 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1975)
(father, nine months, mother, three months); Conlan v. Conlan, 293 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.
1956) (father, six months, mother, six months); Schilleman v. Schilleman, 232 N.W.2d
737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (father, six months, mother, six months); Mansfield v.
Mansfield, 42 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1950) (father, weekends and six weeks of school
vacation, mother, the remainder); Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932)
(father, weekends and summer, mother, remainder); Kinch v. Kinch, 95 N.W.2d 319
(Neb. 1959) (mother, nine months, father, three months); Perotti v. Perotti, 355
N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1974) (joint custody); Guess v. Guess, 274 P.2d 369 (Okla.
1954) (mother, ten months, father, two months); Fortunes v. Manos, 13 A.2d 886 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1940) (father, eleven months, mother, one month); Zinni v. Zinni, 238 A.2d
373 (R.I. 1968) (mother, weekends and two weeks in summer, father, remainder);
Wright v. Stahl, 39 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1949) (mother, ten months, father, two months);
Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn: Ct. App. 1954), cert. denied, Tenn. S. Ct. (Oct.
8, 1954) (mother, weekdays, father, weekends); McGarraugh v. McGarraugh, 177
S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943) (mother, nine months, father, three months); Mullen
v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948) (mother, ten months, father, two months); Brock
v. Brock, 212 P. 550 (Wash. 1923) (father, every other weekend, mother, remainder);
Settle v. Settle, 185 S.E. 859 (W. Va. 1936) (mother, nine months, father, three
months). Cf. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975) (alternating custody,
when supported by substantial evidence, is not clearly erroneous and may be in the
best interest of the child, case remanded); Holman v. Holman, 77 P.2d 329 (Utah 1938)
(no good reason for denying father custody of child for a portion of the year, case
remanded).
" Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications,
65 CAL. L. Rv. 978, 1009 (1977).
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at all times by both parents whereas physical custody is alter-
nated according to the agreement of the parents. Alternate
custody is a term used by courts when physical custody is
placed in each parent alternately for equal periods of time.4
Divided custody describes a custodial arrangement in which
one parent has the child for part of the year (usually the school
year) and the other parent has the child for the remainder
(summers and vacations), each having reciprocal visitation
privileges." While the child is with a parent, that custodial
parent exercises legal control over the child. Split custody is
used to describe a situation where there is more than one child,
and legal and physical custody of one or more of the children
is given solely to one spouse and legal and physical custody of
the others is given solely to the other spouse.49 Often, when
referring to one of these custody arrangements, courts use
vague language or inadequately defined terms. The term "joint
custody" is rarely used; "divided" and "alternate" custody are
the terms most commonly used-often when the exact nature
of the award is unclear. Some courts have approved custodial
arrangements very similar to typical joint custody without
" Priest v. Priest, 202 P.2d 561 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (alternating three-
month periods); Watson v. Watson, 15 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1943) (alternating six month
periods); Travis v. Travis, 180 P.2d 310 (Kan. 1947) (alternating six month periods
until school age, then mother, nine months, father, three months); Heltsley v. Heltsley,
242 S.W.2d 973 (Ky. 1951) (alternating two-month periods); Babb v. Babb, 293 S.W.2d
728 (Ky. 1956) (alternating three-week periods); Mattox v. Mattox, 264 P. 898 (Okla.
1928) (alternating one-year periods); Hamer v. Hamer, 184 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Ct. App.
1944) (alternating six month periods); Pressey v. Pressey, 50 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1935)
(equal time-actual time not given).
" I.A. LNDmay, SEPARATMON AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CoNTRAcrS, §§ 14-60
(rev. ed. 1977). See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 52 So.2d 387 (Ala. 1951); Henning v. Henning,
362 P.2d 124 (Ariz. 1961); Drewry v. Drewry, 216 S.W.2d 888 (Ark. 1949); Searle v.
Searle, 172 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1946); Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So.2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Bagley v. Bagley, 177 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1970); Hellrung v. Hellrung, 72 N.E.2d
647 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947); Stillmunkes v. Stillmunkes, 65 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1954); Lewis
v. Lewis, 537 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1975); Barrier v. Brewster, 349 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. 1961);
Stamper v. Stamper, 216 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1949); Roberts v. Roberts, 194 S.W.2d 1003
(Ky. 1946); Menke v. Menke, 6 N.W.2d 470 (Minn. 1942); Fago v. Fago, 250 S.W.2d
837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Kinch v. Kinch, 95 N.W.2d 319 (Neb. 1959); Guess v. Guess,
274 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1954); Raw v. Raw, 245 P.2d 431 (Ore. 1952); Wallace v. Wallace,
128 N.W. 143 (S.D. 1910); Sprague v. Bucher, 270 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953);
McGarraugh v. McGarraugh, 177 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943); Sampsell v. Holt,
202 P.2d 550 (Utah 1949); Semmes v. Semmes, 109 S.E.2d 545 (Va. 1959); Reynolds
v. Reynolds, 275 P.2d 421 (Wash. 1954); Settle v. Settle, 185 S.E. 859 (W. Va. 1936).
"L=DEy, supra note 48.
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using the term.5" In this Article, "joint custody" is used to
mean concurrent legal custody and alternating physical cus-
tody.51
Some type of shared custody has been judicially recog-
nized in at least twenty-eight states." This arrangement is not
expressly prohibited by statute in any jurisdiction. North Caro-
lina,5" Oregon," Iowa,5 and Wisconsin" statutorily provide the
court with this option. Only in Louisiana is the concept of
shared custody categorically rejected by the courts.7 Because
of their very nature, shared custodial arrangements where pro-
posed by the parents and approved by the courts are not ap-
pealed. For this reason, there may be more joint custody
awards than are apparent in the reported cases. Also, judicial
skepticism in an appellate situation may be justified, inas-
much as appellate decisions which discuss shared custody pri-
marily deal with a shared custody arrangement that has been
imposed upon at least one unwilling party." In such circum-
stances, where one party has appealed the trial court's deci-
sion, the appellate court has reason to question the appropri-
ateness of a shared custody arrangement.
Courts which have awarded shared custody have pro-
E.g., Hockensmith v. Hockesmith, 151 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1941); Riggins v. Rig-
gins, 287 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1926); Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932);
Zinni v. Zinni, 238 A.2d 373 (R.I. 1968); Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1954); Brock v. Brock, 212 P. 550 (Wash. 1923).
31 The type of joint custody referred to in this article is that which the parties have
agreed upon themselves; it is not judicially imposed, but approved. It is important to
note that joint custody does not require alternating residences. However, as it does
often result in some shared physical custody arrangement, this article will treat joint
custody as if there are alternating homes in evaluating the psychological impact on
the child. See text accompanying notes 106-48 infra for a discussion of the psychologi-
cal impact of joint custody.
"1 See cases cited in note 45 supra. See also Note, Divided Custody of Children
After Their Parents'Divorce 8 J. FAM. L. 58, 63 n.26 (1968), in which the author states
that thirty-seven jurisdictions have permitted some type of shared custody.
u N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1976).
OR. Rav. STAT. § 107.095 (1977).
"IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1978-79).
5 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.24 (West. Supp. 1978-79).
Newson v. .Newson, 146 So. 472 (La. 1933).
' See, e.g., Searle v. Searle, 172 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1946); Settle v. Settle, 185 S.E.
859 (W. Va. 1936). In both cases the trial court awarded sole custody and on appeal
the court imposed divided custody. In Sneed v. Sneed, 26 So.2d 561 (Ala. 1946), and
Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948), the trial court's award of divided custody
was upheld over objections by parents on appeal.
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ceeded under statutory authority which directs that the award
be made " 'as the case may warrant,' or as 'is necessary and
proper' or as the children's 'spiritual as well as other interests
may require.' "I' In spite of the existence of this or similar
authority in most jurisdictions, parents have had to overcome
an almost universal disapproval of shared custody. Indeed,
many of the jurisdictions that have approved some type of
shared custody have also indicated judicial hostility toward
shared custody."
Does the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (the Uniform
Act) permit approval of a joint custody petition? The Uniform
Act's scheme, using the "best interest" test, requires that the
court determine custody." Note that this is distinguishable
from a direction to designate a single custodian. The court is
directed to construe liberally the statutory scheme to promote
its underlying purposes. 2 Two of these purposes are to mitigate
,Note, supra note 52, at 63.
"E.g., Aaron v. Aaron, 305 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Ark. 1957) ("[d]ivided custody of
a minor child is not favored, unless circumstances clearly warrant such action");
Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So.2d 397, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ("periodic removal
from familiar surroundings is not desirable nor conducive to a child's welfare"); Merrill
v. Merrill, 362 P.2d 887, 890 (Idaho 1961) ("divided custody should not be encour-
aged"); Mason v. Zolnosky, 103 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Iowa 1960) ("divided custody is to
be avoided if reasonably possible"); Ralston v. Ralston, 396 S.W.2d 775,778 (Ky. 1965)
("Under ordinary conditions we condemn [joint custody for] any child."); McLemor
v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky. 1961) ("avoided if possible"); Towles v.
Towles, 195 S.W. 437, 438 (Ky. 1917) ("Nothing can be more demoralizing. . . than
to have children ...going from one home to another each month."); McCann v.
McCann, 173 A. 7, 9 (Md. 1934) ("avoid, whenever possible"); Schilleman v. Schille-
man, 232 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (generally disfavor alternating cus-
tody); McDermott v. McDermott, 255 N.W. 247, 248 (Minn. 1934) ("As a general rule,
divided custody of. . .a child is not for its best interest"); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 76
So.2d 375, 375 (Miss. 1954) ("It is not to the best interestlof a young child that it be
alternatively shifted from parent to parent."); Mixson v. Mixson, 171 S.E.2d 581, 586
(S.C. 1969) (should be avoided where possible, allowed only in exceptional circumstan-
ces); Bronner v. Bronner, 278 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ("divided custody
...of children of tender years should not be permitted 'except under special condi-
tions in which there is no reasonable alternative and it is made essential and absolutely
necessary'.") (quoting Anderson v. Martin, 257 S.W.2d 347, 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953);
Lumbra v. Lumbra, 5 F ,s. L. REP. (BNA) 2169 (Vt. Nov. 2, 1978) (the court presumed
that "joint custody is against the best interests of the child as a matter of law," and
stated that it should only be "decreed in cases where there is a finding of extraordinary
circumstances.").
1 UNnPORM Acr § 402 provides in part: "The court shall determine custody in
accordance with the best interests of the child . . . ." [emphasis added].
,1 Id. § 402.
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potential harm to the spouses and children and to promote
amicable settlement of disputes between spouses. 3 When par-
ents agree to a joint custody arrangement, refusal to grant their
petition forces them into the adversarial posture of a custody
battle. Such a refusal, when made without a finding that joint
custody would be more harmful to the child than sole custody,
flies in the face of these two purposes behind the Uniform Act's
adoption,
Joint custody is consistent with the Uniform Act's entire
scheme on child custody:
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the
time of the custody decree, the custodian may determine the
child's upbringing, including his education, health care and
religious training, unless the Court after hearing, finds upon
motion by the non-custodial parent, that in the absence of a
specific limitation of the custodian's authority, the child's
physical health would be impaired, endangered or his emo-
tional development significantly impaired."
This provision contemplates mutually agreed upon custody
arrangements between the parents as well as joint decisions by
more than one custodian. Also, it should be noted that, as one
factor in determining joint custody, the court must consider the
wishes of the child's parents. 5
Ultimately, the standard provided the court, the child's
"best interests," is a summation of all the factors the court
must examine to determine this interest. The five factors in the
act are those most commonly relied upon in appellate opinions,
but the court is not limited by statute to the consideration of
only those five."6 The court's discretion in deciding custody is
consistently recognized as being very broad. One appellate
court has said:
n Id. § 102(2),(3).
" Id. § 408.
" Id. § 402(a).
" Id. § 402. The court is directed to consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
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(Tihe trial judge's discretion in determining the best inter-
est and welfare of the child when making a custody award is
indeed broad .... [Tihis Court has continually refused to
establish rigid guidelines which a trial court should follow
when determining questions of child custody.67
Clearly, in light of the diverse family situations coming
before the court, there can be no one custody arrangement
which is, as a matter of law, in the best interests of the child.-
Conversely, because the court must make a case-by-case deter-
mination, neither can a particular arrangement be presumed
to be against those interests. The statute's grant of discretion
requires the court to consider a joint custody proposal and
allows the court the statutory option of approving joint custody
awards.
The reported cases that have disallowed joint, divided, or
alternate custody" should be construed to mean only that, in
those cases, the "best interests" test was not met. These out-
comes, as contrasted with situations where shared custody was
approved, only indicate that families are different and that no
one rule can be applied to fit all situations. The court's statu-
tory authority to exercise broad discretion on a case-by-case
basis encompasses these differences.
Many jurisdictions no longer recognize a tender years pre-
sumption"-a presumption that may have caused some courts
to disfavor joint custody. For example, in 1978, the Kentucky
legislature, responding to the decision in Casale v. Casale,10
enacted a law which ensures that there is no prima facie right
to the custody of a child in either parent. The court is now
specifically directed to give equal consideration to each par-
ent.71
It is not known how many joint custody awards are made
by the courts or how many of those that are made work. They
"Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 458 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Ky. 1970). See cases cited in 27B
C.J.S. Divorce § 310 (1959).
0 E.g., Ralston v. Ralston, 396 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); McLemore v. McLemore,
346 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1961). See also cases cited in note 60.
0 Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1978,
4 F m. L. REP. (BNA) 4033, 4039-40. (Twenty-six states have expressly rejected the
tender years presumption by statute or court decision).
T, 549 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1977).
, Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.270(1) (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. See also
Freed & Foster, supra note 73, at 4040. (Twenty states have equalized parental rights).
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probably comprise a relatively small percentage of all custody
arrangements at the present time.72 Legal commentators agree
that a joint custody request and award appears, at present, to
be limited to a small number of highly sophisticated couples,
frequently professionals.73
In any case, it is clear that courts have been authorizing
joint custody, under a variety of labels, for some time. It is also
clear that statutory authority exists which gives courts discre-
tion to impose a joint custody provision upon unwilling par-
ents. As a corollary to the power to impose this type of arrange-
ment, the court has the authority and discretion to approve a
joint custody agreement between parents who seek to cooperate
in childrearing.
C. The Constitution and Joint Custody
Ironically, if it were not for the fact that two parents who
propose joint custody are seeking dissolution of the wife-
husband relationship, the state's power to intrude on parental
allocation of childrearing decisions and living arrangements
would be recognized by all as severely circumscribed under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized that the relationship be-
tween parent and child and relationships within the family
enclave are constitutionally protected from state intrusion.7'
Termination of the wife-husband relationship does not dissolve
this protection. Therefore, denial of two parents' joint custody
petition, absent a finding that joint custody is more detrimen-
tal to the child than sole custody, contravenes constitutional
guarantees of liberty and privacy.
The situations vary widely in which the insulation of the
12 However, the amount of mass media attention to this type of custody arrange-
ment would indicate an increase in such awards. See Levine, Parents Agree to Joint
Custody, CmSTrAsN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 5, 1975 at 7; Holley, Joint Custody: The
New Haven Plan, Ms., Sept. 1976 at 71; Fager, Co-Parenting: Sharing the Children
of Divorce, SAN FtANcIsCo BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 1977 at 9; Baum, The Best of Both
Parents, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 31, 1978 (Magazine), at 45; Molinoff, Joint Custody:
Victory for All?, N. Y. Times, March 6, 1977, at 18.
n Bodenheimer, supra note 46, at 1011, n.188.
The fact that parents who have been seeking joint custody are usually profession-
als is not meant to imply that this author believes that only such couples are capable
of or entitled to this type of custody award.
1' See Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
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parent-child relationship and family have been recognized. An
examination of these cases shows a deference to parental deci-
sions as to what values and living arrangements parents wish
to provide for their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska" the Su-
preme Court upheld the parents' right to have their children
taught the German language. The Court noted that the liberty
guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment "denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraints but also the right of the
individual to marry, establish a home and bring up children., 71
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters" the Supreme Court found that
an Oregon statute requiring children to attend public schools
interfered with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol."78 In Prince v. Massachusetts," the Court upheld a state
law banning street solicitation by children when applied to a
Jehovah's Witness family. It noted, however, that:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder .... And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions [Meyer and Pierce] have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
More recently in Wisconsin v. Yoder8 the Court upheld
the claim of Amish parents to remove their children from state
compulsory education after the eighth grade. The Court said
that "the values of parental direction of the religious upbring-
ing and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society." 8 The Supreme Court's
invalidation of a statute which allowed sterilization of habitual
criminals in Skinner v. Oklahoman was premised on the funda-
mental nature of the right to marry and to procreate."4 In
' 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' Id. at 399.
' 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
I d. at 534-35.
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 166.
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
n Id. at 213-14.
n 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
" Id. at 541.
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Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur,"' a mandatory leave
provision for pregnant school teachers was invalidated because
it unnecessarily interfered with the decision to raise a family.
The Court reiterated that the "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.""6
Other Supreme Court decisions similarly protect the fam-
ily from state intrusion.8 In Stanley v. Illinois" the Court pre-
served the family unit's integrity from unwarranted state intru-
sion even though the family relationship was not legitimized by
a marriage ceremony. The challenged Illinois statute, as ap-
plied, created a presumption that the father of illegitimate
children was unfit to raise his children. The Court, in striking
down this statute, based its decision on the due process and
equal protection clauses of 'the fourteenth amendment and on
the ninth amendment. The Court said:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful counterveiling interest, protection. It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to
this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal
is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting eco-
nomic arrangements.'8'
The state was required to afford the father a hearing on his
fitness-rather than presuming his unfitness-before it had
power to dismember the father's family.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio"° the Court recog-
nized that a "family" can be defined more broadly than the
nuclear family unit. It invalidated a zoning ordinance which
imposed criminal sanctions on a grandmother who was living
"414 U.S. 632 (1974).
- Id. at 639-40.
10 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of woman to obtain an
abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried adults to
purchase contraceptive devices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
of married adults to purchase contraceptive devices).
"405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 651.
" 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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with her son, the son's child, and another grandchild, the son
of a deceased daughter. The Court reasoned:
But unless we close our eyes to the basic reason why certain
rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we
cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these preced-
ents to the family chioice involved in this case. 1
The Constitution, then, guarantees the individual the
right to decide whether to create a family at all. Parents' deci-
sions about value transmission, and indeed, life style and defi-
nition of the family unit, are accorded great deference. The
Constitution guarantees parent and child a zone of privacy
which surrounds the "family" and protects it from state intru-
sion.
The "family" and the parent-child relationship are not
absolutely immune from state intrusion. However, any state
intrusion on choices affecting family living arrangements or
traditional parental decision-making areas will be stibject to
close judicial scrutiny."2 For an intrusion to be sustained, a
legitimate state purpose must exist.93 The means chosen to
advance that purpose must be more than tenuously related to
its achievement."
The Supreme Court has reached divergent results when
using this test. For example, in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland," the state attempted to justify the challenged zon-
ing ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimiz-
ing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue fin-
ancial burden on the school system-all of which were legiti-
mate state interests. However, because the ordinance inter-
jected the state into family living arrangement choices among
blood relatives, the usual deference accorded state decisions
was put aside. The Supreme Court closely scrutinized the
means chosen to attain the articulated ends. It found that,
although the goals were legitimate, the ordinance failed be-
cause only a tenuous relationship to the achievement of those
Id. at 501.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
"Id.
"431 U.S. 494.
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goals was demonstrated.9 6
In Prince v. Massachusetts" the state's power to regulate
children's employment prevailed over parents' assertions of the
right to control their children and over claims of freedom of
religion. Forbidding street solicitation by children was a per-
missible means to curtail the crippling effects of child labor.
Contrast that case with Wisconsin v. Yoder.' Because of the
intense conviction of Amish parents that secondary education
was at odds with their religious faith and an infringement on
their parental perrogatives as to value transmission, it was
impermissible for a state to require Amish children to attend
school until age sixteen. Such a requirement was an invalid
means of achieving the legitimate state purpose of educating
children.
No easy solution or handy rule is available to aid the courts
when the state attempts to act to protect children's welfare.
Each attempt must be examined with respect to the means
employed. An examination of the area of education provides an
analogy that is helpful in analyzing the state's interest in cus-
tody arrangements. No one seriously challenges the legitimacy
of the state's right to require that children be educated. How-
ever, the state cannot choose a law as a means of achieving that
important interest which requires all children to attend the
state's public schools. The Constitution "excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only."9 Even though
the state's interest in education is a legitimate one, the integ-
rity of the family and the parent-child relationship necessitates
that the means chosen to achieve state purposes must be care-
fully structured to minimize the intrusion into this relation-
ship.
Just as education of children vitally effects the state's wel-
fare, children's shelter and care arrangements are important
and legitimate state interests. The state's real interest is that
the child have adequate physical and emotional care. No one
form of custody can be applied to every situation to achieve
this purpose and still satisfy the requirement that the means
" Id. at 500.
" 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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chosen be more than tenuously related to the state's purpose
so as to minimize the intrusion on the parent-child relation-
ship. This purpose can be achieved when two parents request
joint custody by giving deference to the parents' choice of the
style and structure of the post-divorce environment of their
children, unless joint custody is found to be more detrimental
to the child than sole custody.
Absent the divorce action, assuming no abuse or neglect
allegations, the state could not justify any intrusion into alloca-
tions of decision-making between the parents. The parents may
decide to share the responsibility for decisions concerning the
education, religious training, and health care of the children.
They may send their children to boarding schools and com-
pletely delegate day-to-day care to third parties. They may also
decide that only one parent should decide issues of religious
training, while the other should determine education and
health care issues. Even if the parents in an ongoing marriage
decide that their children should live half the time with one
parent and half the time with the other parent, each half in
separate residences, the state would have no power to override
that decision.
Initiation of the divorce proceeding gives the court the
power to review the proposed custody arrangement. The court
should not, however, substitute its judgment for that of the
child's parents unless the facts show the proposed arrangement
will result in harm to the child. This principle has been re-
cently articulated by the Supreme Court on two occasions. In
other than a divorce proceeding the Court recognized that the
state cannot, under the guise of acting in the "best interests"
of the child, intrude on the family without a showing of unfit-
ness:
One of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
... is the freedom to 'establish a home and bring up chil-
dren' .... If a State were to attempt to force the breakup
of a natural family, over the obbjections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's
best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would
have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter."
1- 431 U.S. 816, 860-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Quilloin v. Wal-
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In a neglect proceeding, the state bears the burden of
showing the parent's unfitness before it can interfere in the
parent-child relationship or terminate parental rights. Re-
cently much has been written on what due process rights
should be accorded to parents in these neglect proceedings. °1
Commentators as well as the courts ' have been groping for a
way to protect the parent-child relationship and the family
from unwarranted state intervention while protecting the child
from neglect. In neglect proceedings, parents come before the
court tainted with allegations of improper or inadequate par-
enting, allegations that there is a real danger to their child's
health or physical safety. These parents are recognized as hav-
ing certain minimal constitutional rights which must be pro-
tected; yet, in a divorce proceeding, the state's power to disrupt
totally the parent-child relationship with an award of sole cus-
tody has gone unchallenged." 3
How does the courts' general refusal to consider joint cus-
tody as an option square with the treatment of parents in neg-
lect and other proceedings? Simply, it does not. The effect of
the court's operational assumption in a divorce proceeding is
to create a presumption against joint custody. Using due pro-
cess concepts of liberty and privacy as gleaned from the case
law, this is impermissible.
Some may argue that due process notions are inapplicable
because, by virtue of the divorce proceeding, the family unit is
dissolved. It is true a nuclear family no longer exists but the
protected zone extends to family life. The private realm which
cott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
"I See Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child
Neglect Proceedings, 17 Amz. L. REv. 1055 (1975); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Moni-
toring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REv. 623 (1975-76); Note, Dependency Proceedings: What Standard of Proof?
An Argument Against the Standard of "Clear and Convincing," 14 SAN DraaO L. REv.
1155 (1977); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1973-74); Note, State v. McMaster: Due Process in Termination
of Parental Rights, 8 Wnrimr L.J. 284 (1972).
10 See, Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District Court,
406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
113 But see Starkeson v. Starkeson, 5 Family L. Rep. 2403 (N.H. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14,
1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting); TImE, Jan. 29, 1979, at 61 (six Texas fathers and
Fathers for Equal Rights have brought a class action challenging state district court
judges refusal to grant joint custody).
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has been protected from the state's intrusion is limited to nei-
ther the nuclear family nor one legitimized by the law. Such
an argument also fails to appreciate the dynamics of the con-
tinuing parent-child relationship. The child's parents ought
not be subjected to the threat of the court's power to affect
vitally their relationships with their children when the sole
reason the parents are before the court is to request the termi-
nation of the wife-husband relationship.
A decision to award sole custody has the effect of drasti-
cally altering, or, at least, severely curtailing the parent-child
relationship of the non-custodial parent. Because the custodian
is given the power to determine the child's upbringing, includ-
ing education, health care, and religious training, and that
parent has the continuity of companionship with the child,104
the non-custodial parent no longer functions in a "parental"
role.
An intrusion of this magnitude cannot be justified by the
court's beliefs or assumptions that the arrangement is ill-
advised. The state must find from the facts that joint custody
would result in more harm to the child than if an award of sole
custody were made. Only then would it not be in the best
interests of the child. Otherwise, the parents' choice of life style
and allocation between themselves of their respective responsi-
bilities must be respected. This assertion is buttressed by re-
cent data which suggest that joint.custody may be more benefi-
cial to the child of a divorce than the traditional sole custody
award.0 5 The filing of a divorce petition unarguably gives rise
to a permissible inference that the state may scrutinize ar-
rangements for the children's care to determine if the children
are in need of the state's protection. However, unless there is a
finding that mutually requested joint custody is more detri-
mental than sole custody the court has no power, constitution-
ally, to deny the request.
I" See 9 UNwoRM LAWS ANNOTATD 510 (1973). Section 408(a) of the Uniform Act
provides in part that "the custodian may determine the child's upbringing, including
his education, health care, and religion."
Section 407 of the Uniform Act provides that "[a] parent not granted custody of
the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights." (Emphasis added). It also allows
the court to deny or modify visitation rights if to do so would be in the best interest of
the child.
10 Grief, supra note 18; Keshnet, supra note 18.
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1II. JOINT CUSTODY As A SOLUTION
A. The Psychological Problems With Sole Custody
The judge has authority to grant a petition for joint cus-
tody. Given the constitutional deference to parental choices, a
judge can not reject this proposal out of hand. No empirical
evidence justifies a belief or assumption that joint custody is
more harmful than sole custody.
When judges make custody decisions, they act in an extra-
legal capacity. The standard given them does not require the
application of law, but the application of psychological princi-
ples with which to deduce, or perhaps divine, what is best for
the child. The standard principles are that the children need
love and nurture together with stability and continuity."6 The
court's goal is to place the child in the environment where these
needs will be best met.
These needs are met by the formation of a warm, intimate,
and continuous relationship described as an attachment
bond.0 ' Children look to their parents, the persons closest to
them, to supply this relationship. The court also views the
parents as the source of this bond. Ninety percent of the time,
the court attempts to ensure this relationship by placing the
children with their mothers in permanent, single custody.0 8
The mother is presumed to be the better provider of love and
child care. It is also presumed that the physical stability and
continuity of living in a single home promotes emotional stabil-
ity and continuity of the parent-child attachment bond. The
court's designation of a custodian, regardless of which parent
is selected, is no guarantee that the children's needs will be
met. It is certain, however, that a sole custody award does not
take into account the children's existing attachment to the
parent relegated to visitor status.
Generally, children develop an attachment to both par-
ents, even though one parent may play an inactive role in the
child's development. These attachments are different from
others because children depend on themofor their security or
well-being. If either of these attachments is severed, children
I" See E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE Cyc. (1959); Go.isTEIN, FREUD &
SoLrr, supra note 6.
' M. RuTrER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION RESSESSm 15 (Penguin Educ. 1972).
" Roth, supra note 11.
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suffer greatly. 10 Not only do they hurt from the present loss,
their future relationships may be jeopardized. For example,
once these attachments are broken, children may become re-
luctant to place their trust in someone else as completely. They
will form new attachments, but in all probability these ties will
not be as strong as they would have been if the early attach-
ment bond had not been severed.110
Studies of children in post-divorce situations often find
them longing for the missing parent. In one study, it was noted
that "[w]hile it is not suprising that most children miss their
father as a result of the separation inherent in a divorce action,
the intensity of the response. . . was striking.""' The children
often feel abandoned and rejected. It shakes their basic sense
of security to see someone they have loved and trusted gone
from their lives. One researcher observed: "His father is part
of the constellation which represents the child's security. It is
just at this moment, when he is faced with the apparent loss
of his father, that he most needs evidence of his father's
love."" 2
When placed in sole custody, children often see the absent
or "visiting" parent as a second-class person; if the children
have identified with this parent, they may feel inferior also.
Reducing this bond to a second-class status produces
"difficulties which. . . can be traced through later years and
even into the ultimate marriage of these children."" 3
Another problem that arises when children are placed in
sole custody occurs when the custodial parent begins to seek
companionship with other adults. The children feel threat-
ened; they see this other adult as a rival for the parent's affec-
tion and generally have a difficult time handling this added
measure of fear. With only one parent upon whom to rely, the
children fear that something may happen to that parent and
M J. DEspmrr, CHIDREN OF DIVORCE 83 (1959); R. WEiss, MIA.AL SEPARTION 42-
44 (1975); Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 161 (1963).
' See J. BOWLBY, I ATrAcHmENT AND Loss: ATrAcHmENr (1969); GoLnSrmN, FREUD
& SOLiNT, supra note 6, at 32-34; Note, supra note 109, at 161 n.44.
"I Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce, Experiences of the Child
in Early Latency, 46 Am. J. ORmo-PsYcmATRY 20, 26 (1976).
'z DEsPERT, supra note 109, at 49.
"' Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
Instrument, 73 YmE L.J. 1197, 1199 (1964).
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that they will be left alone.1 4
Compounding the problem of the children's insecurity is
the common feeling of personal fault for the divorce. The chil-
dren of divorce often feel that they have contributed to the
breakdown of the family. "Daddy or Mommy is leaving be-
cause I have been bad." This feeling of culpability can give rise
to the fear that perhaps the parent who remains will leave also.
B. The Benefits of Joint Custody
Thus, while single-custody may be characterized by physi-
cal stability and continuity, the child's emotional well-being
may not be enhanced. Children in single-custody homes may
feel rejected, unloved, and insecure. It is not surprising that a
recent study found the happiest children in post-divorce situa-
tions were those who had the most access to their other, i.e.,
noncustodial, parent."' Similar findings were reported in a
study of 63 father-child relationships in post-divorce situa-
tions. That study questioned whether conventional custody
and visitation arrangements actually serve "the best interest of
the child":
Children need active involvement with both parents and the
findings clearly indicate that fathers with joint custody
and/or high contact with their children continue to have a
high degree of influence in the child's growth and develop-
ment. Rather than impose legal visitation restrictions, the
courts should do everything in their power to further contact
between the child and both parents, including the appoint-
ment of conciliation counselors to help work out custody
disputes in favor of joint custody."'
No evidence supports the argument that it is harmful to
let a child live with both parents. It is apparent that the
"stability" which is important is not physical stability but
rather emotional stability. Emotional stability is a function of
the child's sense of security. If the child knows that he or she
is wanted by and can live with both parents, the child's sense
of security will be enhanced. If a parent becomes ill or must
leave for a short period, the other is there to take over. The
"' DESPaRT, supra note 109, at 33.
m Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 111, at 27.
"' Grief, supra note 18, at 96.
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child is not confronted by the threat of abandonment.
Joint custody provides for continuing contact between par-
ent and child. It is reasonable to infer that this contact in-
creases the probability that the children will maintain attach-
ment bonds to both parents. Goldstein, Freud, and Solint in
their book, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, argue that
shared custody, with its time splits between parents, disrupts
the continuity necessary for the maintenance of the attach-
ment bonds to either parent.117 In essence, they say no one wins
in shared custody, and it is better to sacrifice one relationship
than to risk disrupting two. They go on to state that sole cus-
tody is necessary for a child because even short separations
disrupt the attachment bond.1 The concomitant admitted ef-
fect of sole custody is that the child's relationship with the non-
custodian will be drastically affected. Interestingly, these au-
thors offer no evidence to support their theory that sole custody
is desirable to facilitate the remaining attachment bond. It is
directly contradicted by studies of children who regularly expe-
rience separation from their parents.
A study of infants in a day care center found no less of a
mother-child attachment than that of infants who were reared
at home."' Similar reports have been made from other studies
of children in day care programs. 2 ' Children in a kibbutz had
strong attachments to their parents even though they saw them
only a few hours each day and on weekends.
1 21
The general feeling expressed by those doing research in
this area is that it is the quality of the time the parent spends
117 GoLwsTEiN, Fanun & SoLNT, supra note 6, at 32-34.
I's Id.
H Caldwell, Wright, Honig & Tannenbaum, Infant Day Care and Attachment,
40 AiA. J. ORTHo-psycHIATRY 397, 406, 410 (1970).
This study involved 41 children averaging 30 months of age and compared the
mother-child attachments of 18 who had day care and 23 who stayed at home:
[C]hild-mother and mother-child attachment were not adversely affected
by the kind of early day care experience provided in this setting. We have
further shown that attachment patterns are to some extent associated with
the developmental level of the child and are rather strongly associated with
amount and quality of stimulation available to the child within the home.
Id. at 409.
I" See Segal & Haas, The Working Mother: A Review of Research, 34 CHILD Day.
513 (1963); Stolz, Effects of Maternal Employment on Children: Evidence from
Research, 31 CHILD D-V. 749 (1960); Yarrow, Maternal Employment and Child
Rearing, 8 CHrLDRN 223 (1961).
M' Y. TALMON, FA~mm AND COMMUNITY m THE KmBUTz 13-14 (1972).
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with the child, rather than the quantity, which maintains the
relationship 22 and thus the attachment. A study of fathers hav-
ing joint custody found that the fathers' relationships to their
children actually became closer than before divorce. ' In an-
other recent study, those fathers who were able to have signifi-
cant involvement with their children found they had "a sense
of loving their children more" and did not take them "for
granted anymore." '' For several reasons, the quality of time
that both parents spend with their children will probably be
greater with joint custody than with sole custody and visitation
rights. Parents sharing custody must cooperate with each
other: a sharing, positive attitude between the parents is far
more likely than in a sole custody situation. Also, since chil-
dren are less likely to view one parent as a "second-class" par-
ent, each parent will have more respect in the children's eyes.
Thus, the idea that uninterrupted physical custody is nec-
essary for continuity of relationships is simply not supported
by the evidence. As a practical matter, uninterrupted physical
custody is a rare occurrence, even under a traditional custody
arrangement. Usually visitation rights are awarded by the
court or agreed to between the parents. The courts are seem-
ingly not troubled by the child's sense of continuity or stability
if visitation results in what is, in fact, shared custody. Thus,
children may "visit" their noncustodial parent every weekend
or three months every summer, but they may not "live" with
that parent for similar periods of time. It is hard to imagine
that children will suffer instability only if their stay is with a
parent who has custodial rights but not be affected if the par-
ent has visitation rights.
Even though sole custody with visitation rights may be
similar to joint custody in the amount of time parents and child
spend together, the many advantages of joint custody make it
preferable. Not only will the quantity and quality of time spent
together increase and the attachment bond with both parents
continue to be strong, but the child is assured of the continued
care and guidance from both parents. By being exposed to the
uniqueness of each parent, children's life experiences are en-
'2 RmrrER, supra note 107, at 18; Mahoney & Mahoney, Psychoanalytic Guide-
lines for Child Placement, 19 Soc. WomK 688-93 (1974).
"2 Keshet, supra note 18, at 53.
"I Greif, supra note 18, at 89.
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larged. Children will have an extended family from which they
can receive the care, guidance, love, and affection necessary to
emotional development.' Putting aside these benefits to the
child, why would parents choose this structure in which to raise
their children?
For those parents who are willing to expend the physical
and emotional energy to make a joint custody arrangement
work, there are benefits which provide incentive for the parties
to cooperate. First, it saves one parent from being forced either
to give up the child or to proceed into a custody battle. Even
the winner of a custody battle is not assured permanency. Bit-
ter feelings engendered by the dispute can provide fuel for a
desire to get even and the loser may try later to win the child
back. In joint custody neither parent loses the child, but in
order to ensure that it will work, parents must be willing to
cooperate with each other.
Another incentive is the fact that joint custody gives each
parent some free time-to rebuild a new life and establish rela-
tionships with other adults.' 6 Most single parents must work
full time and, in addition, care for their children. Few feel they
have enough time for their children, much less for them-
selves.'7
Joint custody helps relieve the incredible pressure the sin-
gle parent faces. Given time to pursue their own interests, par-
ents can be more effective with their children when they have
them. It can also give parents an added sense of security to
know there is someone else that they can rely upon to care for
the children. The result can be a more relaxed parent and a
better atmosphere for the children.
There is evidence which shows that women are finding
childrearing responsibilities increasingly difficult to manage as
more of them seek careers.'1 Because some social scientists
have asserted that motherhood is not instinctive but rather
learned behavior,'"' there is good reason to believe that not all
I's RoMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 119-20.
"' Eder, Shared Custody-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 16 CONCum'AnON
CoumRs Rnv. 23, 24 (1978).
'W WEiss, supra note 109, at 84.
lu ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 40.
I" See, e.g., Benedek, Motherhood and Nurturing, in PARENTHOOD ITS PSvCHOLOOY
AND PSYCHOLOPATHOLOGY 153, 154 (E.J. Anthony & T. Benedek eds. 1970).
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mothers want sole custody of their children. Yet, our society
would severely sanction the mother who openly admits she does
not want the total responsibility of her children. Few women
would be willing to face this kind of criticism or self-imposed
guilt. It is likely that such a mother would seek custody despite
her own true feelings. A judge probably would not be able to
discern this attitude in an adversary setting. Even though it is
never desirable for parents who do not want their children to
have custody, a joint custody arrangement may work to give
each parent the degree of responsibility desired.
It is not difficult to see why parents, who have both de-
manding careers and equally demanding children, have begun
to seek alternatives to the traditional sole custody arrange-
ment. It is also unrealistic and even harmful to assume that
fathers, who have become involved in raising their children
during marriage, will be willing to let go and end meaningful
contact with their children at divorce. In speaking in favor of
joint custody, one researcher remarked that "the lives that are
being lived in America today are already phenomenally differ-
ent from the assumptions that are governing custody decisions
at present. The nuclear family . . .composed of the bread
winner, bottle warmer and children is already a nostalgic
dream." 3 0
The idea that sole custody must be given to one parent and
financial responsibility to the other, which is done today in
ninety percent of all custody awards, 3' significantly ignores the
fact that the parents no longer live that way during their mar-
riages. There is no reason to assume they will want to adopt
this role upon divorce. According to one authority, in the dual
career household, "parenting will inevitably be shared
whether, in fact, the marriage remains intact or not."'' 32
When parents seek joint custody they present the court
with an opportunity to continue the attachment bond with
both parents. The children's relationship with their parents has
not been substantially altered by the divorce.'1 Both parents
are seeking legal sanction merely to continue sharing their par-
ental responsibilities. The family is altered in its physical
" Roman, The Disposable Parent, 15 CONclTIOuoN CoumRS REv. 1, 4 (1977).
m Roth, supra note 11.
In3 Roman, supra note 130, at 4.
"' ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 112-13; Eder, supra note 126, at 23.
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structure, as it is no longer contained in the same home, but
the parent-child relationship can continue. It is anomalous
that, under the guise of preserving stability and continuity, the
courts insist upon disrupting an intact parent-child bond.
Another benefit of joint custody is that the initial trauma
of the divorce may be reduced. This result springs from the
difference between a joint custody request and a contested cus-
tody situation. The only similarity is that both parents are
seeking to retain custodial rights. Unlike the contested custody
situation, parents petitioning for joint custody have agreed to
share the responsibility for, rather than fight over, the children.
The children are not in limbo, wondering with whom they will
live. The only uncertainty is whether the joint custody proposal
will be approved by the court. The children are assured of
having two homes where they are wanted and loved. 34 Reduc-
ing the uncertainties engendered by divorce is a positive factor
which may decrease the trauma of the parent's divorce.
C. Possible Problems With Joint Custody
Joint custody cannot be viewed by the courts as a panacea
for all custody cases. There are situations in which joint cus-
tody is not appropriate. Sometimes a parent does not want the
responsibility of children. 35 In that situation, the children's
relationship with that parent is already inhibited. There is
little chance that attachment bonds can be maintained with
both parents. No matter how damaging this is to the children,
there is little a court can do to encourage the maintenance of
the parent-child bond if a parent chooses not to do so. Simi-
larly, joint custody is inappropriate when one or both parents
do not want the other to have custody. The essence of an
effective joint custody arrangement is cooperation between
the parents. A court cannot order cooperation between parents
who refuse to cooperate. For example, parents who have joint
custody find that their children depend on their schedules
and become upset when they are disrupted."'8 If parents are
"I See ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 8, at 120; Eder, supra note 126, at 23; Wein-
man, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAw AND COmTsp. PROB. 721, 726 (1944).
Lm Keshet, supra note 18, at 24 (citing W. GOODE, WoMEN IN DIVORCE 330 (1956));
WmsS, supra note 109, at 163; P. Bart, Divorced Men and Their Children: A Study of
Emerging Roles (a paper presented at the meeting of the American Sociological Asso-
ciation, Washington D.C., 1970).
I Keshet, supra note 18, at 134-42.
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unable to agree to take on the burden of maintaining a strict
schedule so that their children will not be left wondering where
to go, joint custody will not work. In fact, when joint custody
breaks down, scheduling and transportation problems are often
cited as the reasons.137
Parenting in joint custody arrangements is no easy job.
Probably the greatest fear courts have of joint custody is that
it will create in the children a conflict of loyalties. However,
recent studies indicate that conflicts of loyalties exist no mat-
ter what the custody arrangement. Young children in post di-
vorce situations often maintain secret loyalties to the absent
parent at considerable psychic cost.'38 At least in the joint cus-
tody situation children maintain their loyalties openly; they
are expected to loye and want to be with each parent.
Joint custody can also place a child in a conflict of author-
ity. However, the essence of joint custody is that the parents
agree to share the decision-making power. Realistically, chil-
dren obey the parents with whom they are staying. Major is-
sues, if the parents want them enforcd in their absence, will be
agreed upon with the other parent. Thus, conflicts can be
avoided through agreement.
Maintaining authority may be a problem with joint cus-
tody. Parents who have had little experience in day-to-day
child care may not feel secure in their new role. They may try
too hard to please, and lose their children's respect for their
authority.' 9 These problems of authority are not, however, lim-
ited to joint custody. Single parents express difficulty in con-
trolling their children, who often show their displeasure with
the divorce by unruly behavior.'40 Visiting parents have a hard
time gaining respect for their authority because their children
know that the visiting parent's word is not binding on them.
Such parents all too often become the "Santa Claus" figure to
the children; someone who offers treats and outings.'
Joint custodians, having the advantage of the children liv-
ing with them, can continue to discipline the children as they
13 Id.
"3 Walerstein & Kelly, supra note 111, at 29.
" See I. VicroR & W. Wumm, FATHERS & CUSTODY 153 (1976).
'Wmss, supra note 109, at 179-80.
"' VicrOR & WmiKLER, supra note 139, at 126.
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were disciplined prior to the divorce. Children are able to learn
to adapt to what is expected of them.142 Even the development
of different standards in each home is not extraordinarily bur-
densome to children. Differing standards of behavior are ex-
pected all during a child's life. When at school or when visiting
relatives and friends, the child must conform to certain stan-
dards-all of which may be different. Parents living together
are not always consistent with their children.
Sharing responsibility for decision-making is not easy. In
order for parents to continue to be effective parents they must
feel secure in themselves and be able to trust each other.
4 3 It
is especially important that the parents make all necessary
decisions. They cannot leave this to their children. Children
forced to make decisions are often placed in a double bind, that
is, a situation in which any decision will hurt at least one
parent.'"
The authors of Beyond the Best Interest of the Child assert
that it is not possible for children to maintain ties with adults
who are not friends with each other.' Again, they offer no
support for this theory. Even if there were support for this
theory, the likelihood of animosity is less between parents who
can maintain joint custody than those who cannot, given the
cooperation that must exist to make joint custody a success.
Another argument against joint custody has been based on
the general assumption that the parties to a divorce have al-
ready demonstrated that they cannot get along in marriage.
The argument, then, is how can they expect to be able to main-
tain contacts with each other and reach agreements in a post-
divorce setting? The success of any custody situation turns on
the emotional maturity of the parties and their willingness to
provide a good home for their children. Problems of parents
using their children as "tools" for revenge are legion. Whether
there is more chance of this occuring in joint custody is not
clear. The parents may argue over the details of the arrange-
ment but may actually have less chance to take advantage of
each other as both have legally recognized rights. The parents
M Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 122, at 694.
"3 Eder, supra note 126, at 23.
'"4 For example, allowing a child to choose whicli parent to see on a particular
weekend forces the child to make a choice that will hurt the parent not chosen.
10 GoLDSErN, FREuD & SoLNT, supra note 6, at 12.
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are subject to a strong disencentive; if joint custody proves
unworkable and both parents want the children, a contested
custody battle is their only resort.
This is to be contrasted with the power dynamics of sole
custody. In sole custody, the custodial parent can frustrate the
visiting rights of the non-custodial parent, and short of going
back into court, the visitor has no way of enforcing his or her
rights. The sole custodial parent also has more opportunity to
present a negative or distorted picture of the absent parent. In
joint custody, neither parent has a superior legal advantage
and is therefore less likely to take unfair advantage of the other.
Because both parties have legally established rights to care for
their child and to make decisions about their child's welfare,
neither parent can obtain concessions by threatening to pre-
vent the other from seeing the child; nor can one make a major
decision without consulting the other.
The strength of this arrangement is also its basic weak-
ness. Because of the balance of power, deadlocks can frustrate
the whole idea of shared responsibility. Courts may fear that
deadlocked couples will continually resort to the courts for dis-
pute resolutions. A study of joint custody parents belies this
fear. It found that the parents were able to solve their differ-
ences by extrajudicial means using psychologists and social
workers as third party mediators. Only one of the eight pairs
studied returned to court."' This is not surprising. Generally,
parties who agree to settlements out of court are less likely to
return than parties who have fought over custody in court. 147
It appears the parents' individual animosity is overcome
by their concern over the children. In his studies and interviews
with parents utilizing joint custody, Dr. Melvin Roman ob-
served that:
" Keshet, supra note 18, at 151"52.
It is important to note that even though the parents were able to settle their
differences out of court, the men reported that discussions with their wives during the
first year were often "conflictual and anxiety-provoking." As time passed and routines
were established (which lessened the need for frequent contact), the tensions also
diminished. Some fathers admitted to having initiated contact with their ex-spouses
either to gain closer ties with them or to punish them for leaving their marriage. Once
new relationships were started with others, the need for contact with their ex-spouses
declined. Id. at 69-70.
"I See Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child and the Divorce Court, TRI, 26, 34
(May/June 1974).
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When couples want to share custody of their children, they
are able to isolate out their marital conflicts from their paren-
tal responsibilities. In fact, it is not uncommon for joint cus-
tody parents to frankly admit their antipathy toward one
another, but to maintain, at the same time, that they do not
intend to harm their children just because they might like to
harm one another.
148
If courts allow joint custody as an alternative to the tradi-
tional sole custody awards, there is no reason to believe it will
be misused more than sole custody has been. It may, in fact,
offer a solution for those parents who actually want the respon-
sibility associated with custody but do not feel capable of car-
ing for their children alone.
Overall, more studies and data will be needed to assess the
long range impact of joint custody upon children of divorced
parents. However, from the data available, fears expressed by
courts and some psychologists are not borne out. Moreover, the
studies do indicate the children are actually happier in a situa-
tion where they can maintain ties with both parents. Such
signs are encouraging. It shows that even though divorce ends
a marriage, it need not necessarily terminate the family.
CONCLUSION
The mechanics of parental functioning are changing. Chil-
dren today are more likely to have mothers who have substan-
tial employment outside the home and fathers who play active,
nurturing roles in their lives than ever before. It is also more
likely that children today will be required to deal with their
parents' divorce as another growth event in their lives than
were children in the past. Despite these changes in society and
within the home, a child's need for warm, intimate relation-
ships with both parents remains constant. Parents contemplat-
ing divorce must consider how to continue to meet their chil-
dren's needs in light of the termination of their relationship
with each other. Joint custody is one solution chosen by more
and more parents. In most states, joint custody is already an
option available to the courts. It, in fact, can even be imposed
on reluctant parents. It is the subject of much judicial skepti-
cism as well as criticism from psychologists.
I" Roman, supra note 130, at 8.
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When two parents request joint custody, they have made
a choice that warrants great deference from the courts. The
court must give this request not only serious but enlightened
consideration. The child's needs must be met with minimal
interference into the family's zone of privacy To deny such a
request the court must find that more harm would befall the
child under a joint custody arrangement than if sole custody
were awarded.
The court cannot rely on broad assumptions to make this
finding. No empirical data exist which shows that joint custody
is per se harmful to the child. The court in its discretionary
review may certainly examine the logistics of the custody pro-
posal. It may also question the parents on their dedication to
effectuate the proposal. But ultimately the courts must facili-
tate the parents' choice unless facts are found which warrant a
conclusion of harm to the child.
The real goal is to promote the child's emotional stability
by facilitating the maintenance of the parent-child relation-
ship. This may not be synonomous with assumptions of
mother/nurturer, father/breadwinner or the assumption that
having one home is more beneficial than having separate
homes with two active, concerned parents.
[Vol. 67
